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U.S. POLICY: FOOD PRODUCTION IN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES 
by Donald C. Taylor 
This paper reflects observations and experiences ar1s1ng from 
the author's living and working as a specialist in agricultural 
development in Asia during 1965-1980. The basic issues addressed 
are whether the USA should be involved with efforts to improve food 
production systems in low-income countries and, if so, what might 
be the forms of that involvement. 
About one-fourth of the world's population (roughly 1 billion people) is 
estimated to suffer from chronic malnutrition. The diseases, illnesses, and 
personal lethargy associated with malnutrition are traumatic for those who must 
bear their burden and are the cause of national economic and social losses. 
The World Bank's estimate of the average annual per capita income in 1978 
for the USA and 17 other industrialized countries is $8,070 (the USA level is 
$9,590). For the world's 38 low-income countries (LIC's), the corresponding 
income level is $200. These data lead to an undeniable conclusion. The USA 
and other industrialized countries are 11have's11 and LIC 1 s are "have not's". 
From the standpoint of basic human justice, it would seem that the USA has a 
moral responsibility to help LIC's to improve their basic food production 
capacities (hereafter in this paper, such assistance is termed 11food pro­
duction a id"). 
Apart from whatever humanistic rationale that the USA may have for offer­
ing food production aid, it is probably also in the self-interest of our 
country to do so. A hungry region or nation is most often an unstable one. 
The fruits of efforts to combat the seeds of such political instability extend 
greatly beyond the geographic bounds of the food-scarce region or nation, 
especially as the world in which we live ever becomes 11smaller 11 and inter­
dependencies among nations grow. 
A second component of the USA's self interest in offering food production 
aid arises because of the interconnection through trade between basic health in 
our own economy and basic health in the economies of LIC's. At present, 
between 35 and 40 percent of the USA's trade is with LIC's. The scope for 
further expansion in USA exports depends importantly on strength in the economies 
of our trading partners. Efforts by the USA to strengthen the agricultural 
economies of LIC's, therefore, can yield reciprocating benefits to our own 
economy. 
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES 
Any country that extends food production aid to LIC's needs to take into 
account the special features of the potential recipient countries. While LIC's 
vary much from one another, many of them share certain general characteri-
stics that differ greatly from those in our own country. Seven examples follow. 
--The annual population growth rate in LIC's is commonly 2 to 3%; in 
the USA, it is about 0.8%. 
--Not only is the average level of income much lower in LIC's, but 
the distribution of income among households in LIC 1s tends to be 
less equitable. To illustrate, even in Malaysia which is a middle­
income country (an annual per capita income of $1,090), over 35% of 
the population lives below the "poverty-line" income-level of about 
$240 per person per yea�. 
--Basic infrastructure, e.g., roads, telephone, electricity, health 
facilities, in LIC's is generally much less well-developed. 
--The relative importance of agriculture in the overall national 
economy of LIC's is much greater. For example, of the total 
national labor force in LIC's as a group, over 70% is involved in 
farming. The corresponding figure for the USA is 2%. 
.--In many LIC's, crops can be grown throughout the year. Some 
climates are arid, others are tropical. In either environment, the 
role of irrigation to achieve double and triple-cropping production 
potentials is considerable. 
--Population densities in LIC's tend to be high (commonly 5 to 10 
times that in the USA). Food producing farms are small, for 
example, averaging less than 5 acres each in most Southeast Asian 
countries. Wage rates are relatively low, ranging from $1 to $3 
per day in most of South and Southeast Asia. 
--Each LIC has a unique political environment within which its 
national policy-decisions are made. A special component of this 
environment are the institutions that control the access of differ­
ent groups of people to resources. A recipient country's political 
environment--complex, and often in flux--needs to be understood and 
taken into careful account by any country that would extend food 
production aid to it. 
MYTHS ABOUT SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 
To the author, certain rather commonly held presuppositions about the 
nature of LIC's are mistaken. My views, as anyone else's, however, are 
heavily influenced by personal experience, with mine having been primarily in 
South and Southeast Asia. 
1. National political leadership does not recognize the importance of 
increasing food production. 
At one time, some countries gave the food producing sector low 
priority in national development policies. At present, however, very few 
if any South and Southeast Asian countries continue to maintain such a 
perspective. 
Rural people are numerous, they tend to be poor, and they have 
become politically more articulate. National policies increasingly 
oriented to redressing regional and personal imbalances in income and 
wealth distribution result in programs aimed at improving the condition 
of rural people. Since the vast majority of rural people in most LIC 1 s 
produce food, the political climate for expanded investments to increase 
food production tends to be favorable. The world food crisis of the 
early 1970 1 s, plus recognition of the political volatility that might in 
the future shut off traditional supplies of food imports, have also led 
most LIC 1 s to intensify their efforts to become more self-sufficient in 
food production. 
2. People from low-income countries are inferior. 
Some people may believe that LIC 1 s are poor because the quality of 
people living in those countries is inferior. From two standpoints, I 
largely reject this notion. First, to a considerable extent, it seems to 
me that the relative development of different countries depends on 
11circumstances 11 • Three of many such complex and interdependent circum­
stances are: 1) the point in time when an imperative for national develop­
ment becomes strong, 2) the population-land ratio at that time, and j) 
the necessity created by a temperate environment -- and the lack of such a 
necessity in a non-temperate environment -- for planning ahead to meet 
one's personal provisions. 
Second, the people with whom I have worked in LIC 1 s are in many 
fundamental respects no different than Americans or other 11 Westerners 11 • 
Many are bright, capable, sensitive, and dedicated. I think one would be 
very hard-pressed, for example, to find differences in the quality of the 
human component of political and administrative leadership in South and 
Southeast Asia as compared to that in our own country. Farmers in LIC's, 
as well, are no less responsive than American farmers to innovations that 
will improve their economic welfare. When LIC farmers have rejected new 
technology, it has most often been because the technology was not well­
adapted to or was too risky under local conditions, and hence would not 
have been in the LIC fanners' economic best interest. What is different 
in the human resource of most LIC's, however, is that the educational 
level of the vast majority of their populations is less than that in the 
USA. 
3. Conditions in low-income countries are stagnant. 
Economic development involves change. Some people conclude that 
countries whose economies are less advanced are therefore stagnant. While 
LIC economies have historically been stagnant, most no longer are. For 
example, the average annual rate of growth in Gross Domestic Product 
during the 1970's in LIC's was 3.6%. In each of Indonesia and Malaysia 
where the author most recently lived it was 7.8%, and in the USA it was 
3.2%. The initial level in the USA, of course, was much higher so this 
comparison is not intended to discredit the substantial economic achieve­
ment of the USA. 
Population growth rates tend to vary inversely with the level of 
national economic advancement. The world annual population growth rate 
peaked at 2% in the early 1960's. The dropping of this figure to 1 .7%. at 
the end of the 1970's, therefore, represents a considerable advance in 
LIC's achieving control over population growth. In India, for example, 
the annual population growth rate in the 1960's was 2.25%, in the l970's 
it came down to 2.07%, and in the 1980's it is projected to be 1 .7%. 
Southeast Asia's largest country, Indonesia, has also experienced a 
substantial drop in its recent population growth rate. 
Prior to 1960, about 45,000 hectares (111 ,150 acres) of oil palm was 
planted in Malaysia. In the next 20 years, the area expanded by over 6 
times. As a result, Malaysia is now the world's largest producer and 
exporter of oil palm, accounting for shares in the world market of 49 and 
70%, respectively. 
The list of important changes taking place in LIC's could go on and 
on. This is not to imply that all important needs for change are 
currently being met, but rather to suggest that rigidity in structures 
and people in LIC's is not a major impediment to the possibilities for 
those countries to realize further development. 
THE USA RESPONSE TO THE WORLD FOOD PROBLEM 
The world food problem can be viewed to consist of two elements: 1) un­
expected disasters giving rise to unexpected food shortages and 2) a limited 
capacity of individual countries to meet their food needs under 11normal 11 
conditions. The response to these two types of need should be sharply differ­
entiated. Providing "food aid 11 to meet crises differs much from providing 
1
1food production aid11 to help increase local capacities to produce food. The 
first must be short-term -- to avoid depressing incentives to local food pro­
ducers. The second has to be long-term -- to offer prospect of being able to 
overcome the fundamental constraints that underlie national food production 
systems. 
I believe that the USA should continue to stand ready to provide short­
term food aid to meet disaster situations. Our much more fundamental role in 
helping to cope with the world food problem, however, is through the extension 
of long-term food production aid. The objective of such food production aid 
should be to help LIC's to increase their indigenous capacities to produce 
more food, consistent with the resource base, national goals, and other 
political-economic-social factors unique to each such country. 
What does the USA have to offer to an LIC that desires to increase its 
basic food production capacity? In most cases, I do not believe the answer is 
immediate solutions to problems. Experience over time in LIC's, especially 
under the pressure of subsistence survival, has usually generated reasonable 
responses to those problems that have simpler solutions. The problems that 
remain to be solved tend to be those that are persistent and pervasive, ones 
that by their very nature are rather difficult to solve. 
While the freshness in perspective of an outsider may enable him to 
envision a wide range of possible solutions to a problem, an outsider may fail 
to appreciate key elements in the problem situation, and hence propose im­
pertinent solutions to the problem. Further, building long-term strategies 
for overcoming fundamental food production constraints around the problem­
solving of external agents is, in the view of the author, ill-advised politi­
cally and economically. On the other hand, a donor country strategy of 
providing resources to LIC's to enable the LIC's to develop additional capa­
city to deal with their problems, in my view, offers prospect of being both 
effective and without serious potential political liabilities. 
I do not believe that the USA has a corner on the market of problem­
solving skills, but I do think that certain features in the development of our 
country equip us with constructive insight on processes for identifying, 
systematically examining, and overcoming troublesome problems. Faced with 
formidable challenges, for example, the early pioneers who settled in the east 
and those that later pushed the land frontier successively further west, 
mustered personal resources to convert the challenges into opportunities. The 
"work ethic 11 component of American culture involves, among other things, 
individuals and institutions concentrating effort to deal with specific 
pr9blems. The importance of creating and using incentive structures to 
induce desired behavior is fundamental to the "American system". "Science in 
the aid of man" is also deeply engrained in our education, research, and 
public service traditions, especially in land grant institutions such as SDSU. 
These and many other intangible elements underlie the very substantial economic 
and social achievements of the USA, and in turn are, I believe, at the core of 
what we have to offer to LIC 1 s searching for ways to enhance their basic food 
production capacities. 
What are possible forms of food production aid? These can be decribed in 
various ways, but I propose the following categories: capital transfers, 
technology transfers, institution building, and human resource development. 
Some categories overlap with one another (especially the first two), and each 
is multi-faceted. The following descriptions -- intended to communciate a 
flavor of the nature and selected implications of each approach to food 
production aid -- are highly over-simplified. 
Capital transfers involve loans or grants for use of LIC 1 s to strengthen 
their indigenous food production capacities. Loans for rural roads, rural 
electrification, and irrigation infrastructure are examples. The central 
operational focus of international and regional banks, such as the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank, for example, is on capital transfers. Such 
transfers usually involve restrictions on fund-utilization and sometimes 
complementary technical assistance. Factors determining the suitability to 
LIC 1 s of capital transfers include the availability of internal managerial, 
administrative, and technical resources to make effective use of the funds, 
and how the "strings" attached to the use of funds relate to the needs and 
preferences of the recipient country. While capital transfers are an im­
portant tool of food production aid, sometimes countries (especially those in 
st�ategic political positions and/or with good credit ratings) can reach the 
point that their maximum effective absorptive capacity for development funds 
from outside is exceeded. 
Technoloay-transfers involve donor agents offering to LIC's packages of 
technical and financial aid to undertake a particular type of action-project. 
Well-drilling, soybean development, and cattle improvement are illustrative of 
this type of project. This approach usually does not founder at the talking 
stage, i. e., it usually leads to achievement of certain concrete results. 
Potential limitations, hm·Jever, are that the type of project being promoted by 
the external agent may not be suitable to a local production environment 
and/or may not accord with the priorities of the recipient country. On the 
philosophy that something is better than nothing, however, LIC's sometimes 
decide to accept this type of aid even though their priorities do not coincide 
with those of the donor agent. 
Institution building involves attempts by qxternal agents to facilitate 
the introduction and/or development of organizations involved directly with or 
supporting the production of food in LIC's. This approach is illustrated by 
universities in donor countries that are linked to educational, research, or 
public service institutions in LIC's. Emphasis is usually placed on staff 
training, program development, building construction, and/or equipment pur-
chase. 
Properly timed and conceived, institution building projects can involve 
the strategic use of external resources to develop key organizations in 
national food production systems. A limitation , however, is that the develop-
1An additio�al possibility is that the selection of institutions to participate 
in institution building projects is based on short-term rather than long-term 
considerations. 
ment of any institution requires the making of certain policy-decisions 
that in any long-term perspective -- ought to be the prerogative of the host 
institution. As long as an external agent is involved in an instititution­
building effort, however, that agent may be inclined to share in the making of 
such policy-decisions. Such circumstances can be very sensitive, and some­
times have led to consequences sufficiently unfavorable to more than offset 
the 11good 11 accomplished during the early stages of an institution building 
relationship. 
Human resource development involves the use of external resources to 
increase the professional capacities of people from LIC's to deal with the 
food production challenges in their countries. This type of food production 
aid focuses first and foremost on people, not on particular projects or 
institutions. The aid may involve professionals from donor countries living 
and working on�the-job alongside professionals in LIC 1 s, or professionals from 
LIC's going to other countries under programs involving formal study, short­
term training, guided travel, internships, and seminar participation. 
Because the human resource development approach to food production aid 
involves people rather than structures and projects, its short-term results 
are often not very visible. In the longer-run, however, this approach does 
pay off because it strengthens the professional credentials of the political, 
administrative, and technical leadership that ultimately will be making the 
key decisions affecting the course of national development in their countri�s. 
A strategic feature of the human resource development approach to food 
production aid is a minimization of the role of donor agencies in the making 
of policy-decisions in LIC's. This feature accords with the expectations of 
many LIC's in the 1980's--at least those in Asia. Nationalistic feelings and 
desires to be independent from the "colonial legacy of the past" tend to be 
------------------- �· -�-- - - - - -- - - - -
strong. The indigenous capacities to make policy decisions have grown much in 
the past decade. Thus, the possibility of donor countries sharing in the 
making of LIC policy-decisions generally tends to be viewed by LIC 1 s with 
disfavor. Further, the propriety of outsiders playing key roles in the making 
of complex decisions which often involve critical subjective value judgments 
and whose consequences the outsider does not have to bear is, in my vie\'1, 
somewhat problematic. 
CONCLUSION 
All four types of food production aid deserve consideration by countries 
such as the USA as we seek to help LIC's strengthen their capacities to 
produce larger and more equitably distributed supplies of food. The approach 
of perhaps greatest long-run value, and the one with perhaps the least po­
tential political liabilities over the long-run is, in my viev·J, the one in­
volving human resource development. 
The USA -- including the state of South Dakota is without question in a 
strong position to provide educational and research experiences that will 
equip professionals from LIC's to identify, examine systematically 1 and 
formulate plans for effectively dealing with their problems. Extending our 
educational and research resources to the people of low-income countries 
can at the same time pay rich dividends of good will in the important but 
sensitive arena of international relations. 
